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1. Introduction 
Varieties of Indefinites 
Donka F. Farkas 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
Languages that have determiners often have a rich inventory of them. In English, 
indefinite determiners include a(n), some, a certain, this, one, another, cardinals,  
partitives , the zero determiner of bare plurals (in some analyses) , and, according 
to Hom 1 999 and Giannakidou 2001 ,  any. Despite the attention indefinites have 
received in the literature, characterizing what is common to all of them and what is 
specific to each is still an elusive task. This paper investigates the first three deter­
miners in this list, attempting to provide a semantic characterization that accounts 
for their distribution. (For pertinent discussion of issues that overlap to some extent 
with those taken up below, see Kamp and Bende-Farkas 2002, and for a discussion 
of the French versions of some and a certain ,  see Jayez and Tovena (this volume) .) 
The Ds that concern us here share two characteristics : (i) they are indefinite, and 
(ii) they are existential when not in the scope of any operator or quantifier. As seen 
in [ 1 ] ,  they may occur as pivots in existential there constructions, and therefore all 
three form weak DPs . 
[ 1 ]  There's aJsome/a certain mistake here somewhere . 
The indefinite nature of these Ds will be taken for granted in what follows. I stay 
neutral with respect to whether the definite/indefinite distinction is a matter of nov­
elty/familiarity, uniqueness/non-uniqueness or some third property that subsumes 
these two .  
Our three indefinite Ds contrast in various ways. With respect to scope, for in­
stance, only a(n) may occur within the immediate scope of negation or as a generic, 
and a certain, but not the others, is subject to restrictions on its modal interpre­
tation. S ections 3 - 5 propose a semantic characterization that accounts for this 
concentric distribution pattern, as well as for other peculiarities that are brought up 
in the course of the discussion. These core sections are sandwiched between an 
introductory and a concluding section . 
2. Framework 
2.1.  Files, contexts and context change 
I follow FCS and DRT in assuming that the expressions to be interpreted are repre­
sentations 1>, which I refer to here as files . (Files are equivalent to DRSs.) Files are 
constructed on the basis of syntactically analyzed utterance s .  A simple file consists 
of a set XI> of indexed variables (the domain of 1» ,  and a set CI> of conditions. Both 
components should be further structured even in simple files. The elements of the 
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domain of a file should be structured in terms of their saliency or topicality. In what 
follows, however, differences in topicality are ignored since they do not appear to be 
relevant to the subset of indefinites we are investigating here . 1  With respect to con­
ditions in a simple file, I assume a distinction between value conditions and main 
conditions. The role of the former is to specify a set, called value set, from which 
values of a variable are to be chosen . Value conditions play the role of restrictive 
conditions on variables in restricted quantification logics ,  whose advantages for lin­
guistics were first pointed out in McCawley 1 98 1 .2 Complex files involve files with 
auxiliary (subordinate) files as constituents . I follow here DRT (rather than FCS) 
in assuming that these auxiliary files survive in final s tructures .  Auxiliary files are 
introduced by quantifiers, operators and complement-taking predicates .3 
The interpretation of files is done relative to a model M = ( D, W, I, H, A ) , 
where D is a set of entities, W is  a set of worlds, each with its own domain, Dw , 
a subset of D, I is an interpretation function assigning denotations to predicates, H 
is a set of assignment functions, and A is  a set of accessiblity relations on worlds . 
Assignment functions are partial functions from variables and world domains to an 
element of the domain in question. The notions of truth and satisfaction conditions 
are defined as in [2] and [3] respectively. 
[2] cjJ is true in w iff there is anf E H such that! satisfies cjJ relative to w. 
[3] f satisfies cjJ relative to w iff for every Xn E Xt/>, f(xn, Dw) meets the conditions 
in cjJ relative to w. 
Complexity at the interpretation level involves evaluating auxiliary files by auxiliary 
functions other than the initial function or at world domains different from that 
of the initial world. Auxiliary functions extend the initial function on particular 
variables . The world domains are domains of worlds made accessible to the initial 
world by accessibility relations in A. We encounter the former type of complexity 
in discussing quantificational Ds in the next section, and the latter when we discuss 
the modal restrictions on a certain in subsection 5 .2 .  
Crucial to both DRT and FCS is that the semantic characterization of an ex­
pression e involves defining its file change potential . Below I follow Heim 1982,  
Chapter 3 in taking the common ground of a conversation to be a file cjJ. The context 
of cjJ is defined as in [4] (cf. (Heim 1 982,  Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman 1 996, 
Abusch and Rooth 1 997) : 
[4] c( cjJ) = { ( w, f ) : f satisfies cjJ in w }  
The world - assingment function pairs in the context o f  a file relative to a model M 
are the possibilities of cjJ in M. 
The Stalnakerean notion of the context set of cjJ is defined in [5 ]  to be the set of 
worlds that figure in the context of cjJ. 
[5] Wc(cjJ) = { w : there is anf E  H such that ( w, f )  E c(cjJ) } 
To see how Stalnaker' s  notion of context change is captured, assume that an input 
file cjJ is changed into an output file cjJI by uttering an expression e. The context of 
the output file, c(cjJ/) , is defined as in [6] : 
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[6] c( ¢/) = { (  w, ft ) : there is a possibility ( w, / ) E c( ¢) and ft is  a (possibly 
trivial) extension of/that satisfies ¢I in w }  
The context set of c( ¢/) is the set of worlds in the input context that survive into the 
new one, i .e . , those worlds in Wc(¢) relative to which the new context ¢I is true. 
The effect of an expression on its context boils down to how the addition of the ex­
pression in question to a file ¢ affects a possibility ( w, / ) in the set of possibilities 
of its input context, c(¢) . 
2.2. A constraint-based approach to Ds 
Here we are interested in full-fledged, that is, unincorporated, argumental, that is, 
non-predicative, descriptive, that is lexical N-headed, DPs . Minimally, the contri­
bution of such DPs to a file consists in (i) a variable (aka a discourse referent) and 
(ii) a value condition. I assume that the D is responsible for the former, and the NP 
for the latter. The role of the NP is constant across all types of argumental descrip­
tive DPs . We are concerned here with the question of what distinguishes various 
Ds from one another. In the view advocated here, part of the answer involves the 
claim that Ds may be lexically marked for particular constraints they impose on the 
variable they introduce. The distribution of a DP whose D is a determiner d i s  re­
stricted by these constraints in that the DP may occur only under interpretations that 
meet them, and in environments that make these interpretations possible. A similar 
position is taken with respect to NPIs in Giannakidou 1 998 .  It is the standard one 
when it comes to distinguishing between definite and indefinite Ds, i .e . ,  between 
a(n) and the in English. According to Kamp 1 9 8 1  and Heim 1 982,  the constraint 
involved is an ' input context constraint' in that it concerns the status of the variable 
relative to the input file : definite Ds require the variable to be one that is already 
present in the input file, while indefinite Ds require the variable to be new (or, alter­
natively, simply lacking the definiteness requirement) . Under the uniqueness view 
of definiteness, definite Ds impose a constraint on the value set, requiring it to be 
singleton. Another example of a value set constraint is found in Kadmon and Land­
man 1 993 ,  involving the widening of the value set of any. I assume that Ds may in 
principle impose both input context constraints and value set constraints , but will 
not discuss either here. 
I suggest below that Ds may also impose constraints on the identity and prop­
erties of the function (or set of functions) that assigns values to the variable the D 
introduces .  I call this type of constraints functional constraints. We meet func­
tional constraints in the next subsection, when discussing quantificational Ds and 
dependent indefinites and again in subsection 4. 1 . , where the quantificational force 
of some indefinites is discussed. 
Another type of constraint that plays a role in the discussion below, termed 
output context constraints, involves the status of the variable introduced by the D 
relative to the output context. In Section 4.2 .  I argue that constraints of this type are 
part of a complete characterization of some, and in Section 5 it is shown that they 
are crucial in capturing the distribution and interpretation of a certain. 
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2.3. Quantificational vs. non-quantificational determiners 
I follow DRT and FCS in taking the fundamental distinction between quantifica­
tional and non-quantificational Ds to involve the issue of the possible further effect 
of a D on a file, beyond the introduction of a variable. I follow DRT in assuming 
that quantificational D, exemplified in [7] by every, tr�e creation of a tripartite 
complex file as in [7b] . 
[7] a. Every man left. 
b. [ [  X3 :  man(x3} ] ¢' V3 [ leave(x3} ] if>" ]  ¢ 
The satisfaction conditions of [7b] are given ' in [8] :  
[8] f satisfies ¢ in w iff every extensionh off on X3 that satisfies ¢I in  w is such 
that ¢" is true relative to h in w. 
By [2] , the last part of this requirement amounts to the condition in [9] :  
[9] ¢" is true relative to h,  w iff there i s  a (possibly trivial) extension g3 that 
satisfies ¢" relative to w. 
The effect of every on the satisfaction conditions of the complex structure it con­
tributes is to introduce a set of auxiliary functions Fn defined with the help of the 
expression in the Restrictor, ¢/, and to require the expression in the Nuclear Scope, 
¢" , to be true relative to each functionfn E Fn . In the notation adopted here, the set 
of functions Fn are functions that extend a functionf over the value set of a variable 
Xn by assigning it each of the elements in the value set in tum. A set of functions 
that makes a variable cover its value set in this way is called the maximal set of 
extensions off on Xn relative to the value condition on Xn , defined as in [ 10] : 
[ 1 0] Fn is a maximal set of extensions of f on Xn relative to a value condition C 
specifying a value set P iff \?, fn E Fn , fn extendsf relative to Xn andfn meets 
C, and for every s E P, there is an fn E Fn such thatfn = s, and for every two 
functions fn, fin E Fn , fn(xn}=!- fin (xn)· 
As a notational convention, a set of functions that make a variable cover its value 
set, as well as the functions in such a set, are subscripted for the variable in question. 
The evaluation requirement imposed by every on the quantificational structure 
it introduces is given in [ 1 1 ] ,  
[ 1 1 ]  For every fn E F n ,  ¢" is true relative to fn and w. 
where ¢" is the representation of the expression in the NS , and Fn extends f maxi­
mally on Xn relative to its value condition, given by the expression in the Restrictor. 
The effect of every on the evaluation fate of the variable it introduces is to have 
it be given values by the functions in Fn . Common to all quantificational Ds is  
that they impose a tripartite structure of the type in [7b] , where the Restrictor is 
contributed by the NP sister of the D and the Nuclear Scope is contributed by the 
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rest of the sentence. The effect on the satisfaction conditions of the resulting file is  
to introduce a set of functions Fn maximally extending the input function f on Xn 
relative to the value condition of Xn . As a result, Xn, the variable introduced by the 
quantificational D, is given values by Fn . The functional constraint quantificational 
Ds impose on the variable they introduce is that of being assigned values by the 
functions in Fn . I am also assuming that such Ds require the value set of the variable 
they introduce to be non-singleton in at least one possibility in their output context. 
The effect of non-quantificational Ds on the file is simple : they only introduce 
a variable. The simple structure is connected to the fact that such Ds do not involve 
the introduction of auxiliary functions. The rest of this paper examines some ways 
in which non-quantificational Ds differ from one another. 
3. The unmarked singular indefinite a(n) 
The Kamp/Heim characterization of indefinites is, I claim, correct for a(n). I 
rephrase it as in [ 1 2] ,  following Hawkins 1 99 1  and references cited therein, ac­
cording to which the indefinite nature of a(n) is due to the absence of a definiteness 
requirement, rather than to the presence of an indefiniteness constraint. 
[ 1 2] The D a(n) is unmarked in the sense that it contribu,tes no constraints on the 
variable it introduces.4 
The unmarked nature of a(n) is key to its versatility. S ince there are no constraints 
on its functional fate, a variable introduced by a(n) is available for unselective bind­
ing and may occur within the scope of any operator or predicate . We therefore pre­
dict freedom of interpretation and distribution. This freedom is exemplified below 
looking at three special cases : dependent indefinites, generic indefinites, and indef­
inites within the immediate scope of negation. 
(a) Dependent (co-varying) indefinites 
In [ 1 3] ,  where DPs are subscripted with the index of the variable introduced by their 
D ,  
[ 1 3] Every studenti read a poemj . 
the evaluation functions of Xi are the functions in Fi , introduced by every. The sen­
tence is ambiguous due to the fact that Xj is either evaluated by the input function, 
f, resulting in the wide scope reading of the indefinite relative to the universal, or it 
is  evaluated by the functions in a set Gi , which are functions that extend those in 
Fi on Xj . Under this interpretation, the indefinite has narrow scope relative to the 
universal . 5 
The functions in Gi are the functions relative to which the expression in the 
N(uc1ear) S(cope) has to be true. Each function in Gi is an extension of a function 
in Fi . The subscript here indicates that the functions in the set make Xi cover its 
value set. Under the narrow scope reading of the indefinite in [ 1 3] ,  there is a special 
relation between Fi and Gi , characterized in [ 1 4] :  
[ 1 4] For every v E D such that there is an fi E Fi and fi(xi) = v, there is a unique 
function gi E Gi that extends fi on Xj . 
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In cases such as these the values of Xi will be called evaluation parameters for Xj . 
Ds that require dependency 
As a first example of a marked indefinite, we take a brief look at the reduplicated 
form of the indefinite article in Hungarian, discussed in detail in Farkas 1 997. In 
this language, besides the unmarked singular indefinite egy, corresponding to a(n), 
there is also a morphologically marked form, egy-egy, exemplified in [ 1 5] :  
[ 15]  Minden diak olvasott egy-egy verset. 
every student read.Past a-a poem.Acc 
' Every student read a poem.' 
Unlike [ 1 3] ,  [ 1 5] is unambiguous : the reduplicated indefinite must be interpreted 
within the scope of the universal . I suggest that this difference is due to the fact that 
the reduplicated indefinite determiner is a dependent indefinite in the sense that it 
imposes on the variable it introduces the functional constraint in [ 1 6] :  
[ 1 6] Dependency constraint 
The variable Xj introduced by a dependent D must be evaluated by functions 
in a set Gi, where i =I j. 
This constraint can be met only in environments where another expression con­
tributes a set of functions that makes another variable cover its value set. In order 
to meet the constraint, the variable introduced by the reduplicated D will have to 
be within the semantic scope of this expression. We thus correctly predict the lack 
of ambiguity in [ 1 5] as well as the fact that egy-egy indefinites are not felicitous in 
[ 17] , where there is no variable for egy-egy to depend on . 
[ 1 7] *Mari meglatogatott tegnap delutan egy-egy ismerost. 
Mari visited yesterday afternoon an-an acquaintance 
In this approach ,  dependent indefinites are marked for dependency while unmarked 
indefinites are compatible with it. The dependency requirement of the reduplicated 
indefinite in Hungarian limits the distribution of these DPs to environments where 
the requirement can be met. In such environments , the possible interpretations are 
limited to those in which the constraint is met. 
(b) Generic indefinites 
As is well-known, ordinary indefinites in English (as well as in many other lan­
guages) have generic readings, exemplified in [ 1 8] .  
[ 1 8] A seagull is intelligent. 
I assume here that the semantic representation of [ 1 8] is as in [ 1 9] ,  where the generic 
adverb GEN unselectively binds the variable X3 introduced by a in a seagull. 
[ 1 9] GEN3 [X3 : seagull(x3) intelligent(x3) ] 
A variable bound by GEN ranges over default values of its value set because GEN 
has the effect of introducing a set of auxiliary functions that maximally extend the 
input function on the variables bound by it on the default values of their value sets . 
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Given what was said above about dependent indefinites,  it is predicted that they 
cannot occur as generics . That this prediction is correct is shown by the ungram­
maticality of [20] under a generic interpretation. 6 
[20] *Egy-egy sinily okos.  
a-a seagull intelligent 
(c) Indefinites within the immediate scope of negation 
As shown in [2 1 ] ,  unmarked indefinite DPs may occur within the immediate scope 
of negation . 
[2 1 ]  Mary didn't  buy an apartment in S an Francisco when she could have afforded 
it and now it is too late. 
I assume that sentence negation gives rise to complex files of the form in [22] : 
[22] [ ..., <// ] ,p 
The satisfaction conditions of such files are as in [23] : 
[23] A function f satisfies ¢ iff no extension Ji, . . .  ,n off on the variables i, . . .  , n in 
X,p' satisfies ¢/ . 
A variable is ' in the immediate scope of negation ' iff its index is  on the set of func­
tions introduced by the negative operator. In this case the variable covers its value 
set. This may happen only if the variable is in the domain of the file the negation 
is prefixed to . A variable has wide scope relative to negation if it is assigned values 
by f A variable is within the scope of negation but not within its immediate scope 
if it occurs within the domain of a file subordinate to the negated one. 
Given what was said above, we predict that dependent indefinites may not intro­
duce variables that are within the immediate scope of negation, since such variables 
do not meet the dependency constraint. That this prediction is correct i s  shown by 
the ungrarnmaticality of [24] . 
[24] *Mari nem hitott egy-egy sinilyt. 
M. not see.Past a-a seagull .Acc 
Mary did not see a seagull .  
A common characteristic of generic indefinites ,  indefinites within the immediate 
scope of negation, and quantificational DPs is that the variable they introduce covers 
its value set. In the notation used here this means that the variable is evaluated by 
a possibly non-singleton set of functions coindexed with it. (The fact that the set of 
functions is non-singleton correlates with the fact that the value set of the variable 
is  not singleton either.) Unique to quantificational DPs is that the functions that 
evaluate the variable in question are introduced by the quantificational D .  
To sum up so far, the claim made here is that a(n) i s  the unmarked singular de­
terminer in English, which is what explains its versatility. If this is so,  the other D s  
have to b e  marked relative to i t  and therefore will have a more limited distribution. 
The discussion of the reduplicated indefinite D in Hungarian is a first example of a 
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marked D .  In the next two sections we tum to two marked Ds in English, singular 
some and a certain. 
4. Singular some 7 
4.1 .  Scope and quantificational force 
As shown by the scopally ambiguous examples in [25] , some indefinites, just like 
their unmarked sister, may co-vary with an individual or situational variable and 
may have narrow scope relative to dispositional and intensional predicates, as well 
as with respect to conditionals, without being required to occur within the scope of 
any of these expressions . 
[25] a. Every Sunday they chose some hymn that was out of their range. (Gar-
rison Keillor's  Prairie Home Companion broadcast 0411 4/0 1 )  
b.  Each life converges to some center. 
c. In target of opportunity cases the department identifies some candidate 
they want and they offer the position without a search. 
d. I hate imagining you lying there alone, in some godforsaken hospital .  
e .  I want to  get some book about S t .  Petersburg because we  are going there 
soon. 
f. If Ben solves some problem from this list Mr. Koens will praise him. 
Just like a(n) indefinites , some DPs have 'free upaward ' scope. Thus ,  [26] 
[26] Keith decided to buy every album that was published by some famous Hun­
garian photographer. 
has three interpretations : (i) the indefinite has widest scope if the sentence describes 
a situation in which Keith decided to concentrate on a particular photographer, say, 
Lucien Herve; (ii) the indefinite has intermediate scope if the situation described is  
one in which Keith decided to choose one photographer from the group of famous 
Hungarian photographers known to him (Moholy-Nagy, Brassai, Capa  or Herve) 
but has not yet made up his mind which; (iii) the indefinite has narrow scope if it 
describes a situation in which Keith decided to buy every album published by each 
of these photographers . 8 
Some differs from a(n), however, in that it is compatible only with existential 
force. Thus, some may not be interpreted generically in sentences like [27] (as 
noted by Langacker 199 1 ) , and is not available for unselective binding. 
[27] AI* Some seagull lays eggs in the sand. 
The question that arises is how to capture this stubborn existential force. One possi­
bility is to treat some as a quantificational DP, just like every or most, but involving 
an existential quantifier. Under this view, however, the freedom of upward scope 
of some DPs exemplified in [26] remains a mystery, given the well-known limita­
tions in the upward scope possibilities of quantificational DPs . Another option is to 
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treat some as introducing a Reinhart-style choice-functional variable which i s  freely 
bound by existential quantifiers inserted freely in the semantic representation. The 
explanatory gain concerning the scopal properties of choice-functional variables is 
rather modest, however, since we have to stipulate the special nature of the binding 
of such variables .  (See Geurts 2000 for relevant discussion.) 
In line with the proposal for dependent indefinites made above, one way of 
capturing the existential nature of some indefinites i s  to assume that the variable 
they introduce is subject to the functional constraint in [28] : 
[28] Existential constraint 
If a variable Xn is introduced by some its evaluation functions may not be 
coindexed with it. 
Under this view some is non-quantificational , just like a(n) and simply introduces a 
variable, and therefore some is not expected to have the scopal properties typical of 
quantificational DPs . The variable is, however, subject to the functional constraint 
in [28] which rules out interpretations which make this variable cover its value set. 
The constraint in [28] prevents the variable introduced by some from being unse­
lectively bound as well as from being within the immediate scope of negation since 
these interpretations involve the variable being evaluated by a set of co-indexed 
functions . Evaluation fates that are consistent with [28] are: (i) being given values 
by the initial functionj(scopal specificity); (ii) being given values by functions Gm, 
where m =f. n (co-variation) ; (iii) being evaluated relative to a world or worlds dif­
ferent from the world of evaluation of the discourse . The fact that some indefinites 
may be scopally specific, may co-vary and may occur within the scope of modals, 
intensional predicates and conditionals is thus accounted for. 
In the rest of this subsection I examine in more detail the interaction of some 
DPs and negation. As just mentioned, [28] predicts the PPI status of some DPs, and 
therefore the fact that some in [29] may only be interpreted as having wide scope 
relative to negation: 
[29] Mary didn ' t  buy some apartment in San Francisco when she could have af­
forded it and now it's too late. 
Interestingly, [28] alo predicts that some DPs may occur embedded under negation, 
as noted in Ladusaw 1 980 and exemplified in [30] . 
[30] Mary doesn ' t  think that Sue read some recent article on this problem. 
The indefinite here occurs within a file which itself is subordinate to the negated 
one, as schematized in [3 1 ] ,  
and therefore its index will not appear on the functions introduced b y  the negative 
operator. 
It has long been noted, however, that there are several environments where some 
DPs may occur apparently in the immediate scope of negation, in violation of [28] . 
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Szabolcsi 200 1 summarizes these cases as involving either denial ,  as exemplified 
in [32] , or as involving contexts which otherwise license negative polarity items, as 
exemplified in [33] . (The examples are adapted to contain a some DP rather than 
Szabolcsi ' s  someone .) 
[32] A: He found some mistake. 
B :  Wrong ! He DIDn' t/DID NOT find some mistake. 
[33]  a. If we don' t  call some neighbor to help , we are doomed. 
b. Every boy who didn' t  call some friend to help was in trouble. 
c. Only John didn ' t  call some friend to help . 
d .  Few boys didn't  call some friend when they saw the difficulty they were 
Ill . 
e .  Few boys thought that John didn ' t  call some friend. 
We can add to these the real-life example in [34] :  
[34] They want to make sure there isn ' t  some Al Qaeda leader waiting in the wings 
to take over after Bin Laden is eliminated. (NPR, Morning Edition, 1 21 10/0 1 ) .  
Szabolcsi ' s  account o f  [33] rests on  assuming that some bears two negative polarity 
features that become active only in a negative environment. Once active, each has 
to be ' neutralized' ,  one by the negative in whose scope some finds itself, and the 
other by the NPI licensing operator that some scopes under. 
This line of analysis does not extend to [32] and remains somewhat stipulative. 
An alternative that holds the promise of extending to both denials and the cases in 
[33]  would be to refine our understanding of negation rather than complicate our 
analysis of some. A direction worth exploring is to attempt to reduce all cases in 
which some introduces a variable in the domain of a negated file 'lj; to special cases 
of negation, cases where alternatives in which 'lj; holds survive in the output context. 
Denying 'lj;, as in B 's utterance in [32] would fall under this characterization if we 
assume the articulated view of context proposed in Gunlogson 200 1 according to 
which the common ground of a conversation is split into two files, ¢A and ¢B , one 
for each participant. Possibilities in which 'lj; holds survive in the output context 
because after the exchange in [32] , C(¢I A) contains only possibilities that satisfy 
'lj;, while C(¢IB ) does not. The task of showing that in each of the examples in 
[33] relevant alternatives in which 'lj; holds survive in the output context is neither 
trivial nor impossible. The connection with NPI licensing environments could be 
captured by exploiting the fact that what is involved in these examples is a sentence 
S occurring in an environment where alternatives in which the opposite of S holds 
are salient and survive in the output context .  If S is positive, we expect this property 
to connect to NPI licensing; if S is negative, we expect it to connect to PPI licensing. 
Developing these suggestions is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
I conclude that some DPs differ from their unmarked a(n) DP counterparts in 
being stubbornly existential . The functional condition in [28] captures this property 
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without having to treat some DPs as quantificational ,  and thereby preserving a uni­
fied account of the freedom of upward scope of a(n) and some DPs. The condition 
also predicts the lack of generic readings and the PPI-hood of some DPs . Accepting 
it makes us look for a solution to the problem posed by the counterexamples just 
discussed in the realm of negation rather than in the realm of indefinites . The hope 
is that a deeper understanding of NPI licensing in the contexts exemplified above 
will shed light on the partial overlap between NPls and PPls .  
4.2. Unidentified variables 
Capturing the limits on the quantificational force of some does not account for the 
full range of its peculiarities .  In this subsection I attempt to capture the intuition 
that using some is connected to the fact that the value one chooses for the variable 
introduced by it is underspecified in some manner. Note that destressing some or 
adding or other stresses this property, forcing narrow scope relative to want in [35] : 
[35] I want sm book (or other) about St .  Petersburg. 
Note, however, that destressed or modified some does not have to be within a modal 
context (unlike free-choice any) : 
[36] Sm guy (or other) called this afternoon and asked for you. 
The unstressed version and the modification by or other is associated with the fact 
that the identity of the choice of value for the variable introduced by some is imma­
terial , in [35] because the ordering relation on alternatives involved in the semantics 
of want is  insensitive to which book the speaker gets , in [36] because the context 
provides no distinguishing features of the guy who called. In [37] we see an ex­
ample of ' epsitemic non-specificity ' openly confessed: the speaker does not have 
enough information to identify the verifying value of the variable introduced by 
some : 
[37] There's some mistake here somewhere but I don ' t  know where . 
Sentence [38] exemplifies the derogatory flavor that some DPs may have, con­
nected, I claim, to the fact that the verifying value is not to be distinguished from 
others . 9 
[38] Marc wrote some paper (or other) on indefinites and now he considers himself 
a specialist. 
In [39] we see some used in a situation where its verifying value is a particular 
entity (one of the streets enumerated in the sentence) , therefore it is in principle 
identifiable, but the context does not provide the necessary information to narrow 
down the choice to a single street. 
[39] In his deteriorated mental state, he rented a room, a chamber, a little more 
than a hole on some disreputable street - on Kleine Gropel Grube, on En­
gelswisch or on An der Mauer - and then slunk into his hideway to eat his 
pastries. (Th. Mann, Buddenbrooks, translated by John E. Woods, p.  399) 
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In [40] , from Emily Dickinson, we have an example of some whose verifying value 
is not identifiable in principle: 
[40] Our lives are Swiss -/ So  stil l ,  so cool ,! Till some odd afternoon,! The Alps 
neglect their curtains,! And we look farther on. 
In [41 ]  we see that some DPs may not occur as objects of a measure phrase :  
[4 1 ]  *Marc walked some mile before he stopped to rest. 
The next example, from Israel (ms) ,  illustrates a 'no imminent identification ' re­
quirement: if a speaker chooses some it is judged as marked for her to immediately 
go ahead and identify the verifying value in the subsequent discourse without a sig­
nal of change of mind, or in the absence of a request from the audience for more 
information. 
[42] a. Susan rented some movie for us to watch yesterday. 
b. # It was The Maltese Falcon. 
The next two examples show that the use of some is not appropriate in cases where 
the identification of the verifying value is pragmatically irrelevant: 
[43] a. Oh look ! There's a/#some fly in my soup ! 
b. A/# some cab will be waiting for you at the airport. 
We normally don' t  care which particular fly is in our soup once the soup is found 
not to be fly-free, and, similarly, we don ' t  care which particular cab will be waiting 
for us at the airport, as long as we are assured we will not be left on our own. 
The empirical generalization that captures these characteristics is formulated 
in [44] . (See Abusch and Rooth 1 997 for a similar characterization of indefinites 
modified by epistemic adjectives such as undisclosed.)  
[44] After an expression containing some is added to a file ¢ ,  the possibilities 
of the new context c(¢') are required to vary with respect to what value is 
assigned to the variable introduced by some. 
In order to make [44] more precise I first define in [45] the notion of identified 
variables : 
[45] Identified variables 
a. An independent variable Xn occurring in ¢ is identified in c(¢) iff there 
is an a E D such that for every possiblity ( w, f )  E c( ¢) ,  if h is an 
evaluation function of Xn in ( w, f ) ,  h(xn) = a. 
b. A dependent variable Xn occurring in ¢ is identified in c( ¢) iff for every 
parameter v of Xn there is an a E D such that for every possibility 
( w, f )  E c(¢), if hV is an evaluation function of Xn in ( w, f ) ,  hV (xnJ = a. 
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(The values of the subscript on an assignment function are the the values of the 
variable Xn depends on . )  An independent variable is identified in a context iff it is 
assigned the same value in all the possibilities of the context. A dependent variable 
is  identified in a context iff it i s  identified relative to each of its parameters .lO I 
define now unidentified variables relative to a context in [46] : 
[46] Unidentified variables 
a. An independent variable Xn occurring in ¢ is unidentified in c( ¢) iff 
there are at least two elements al and a2 E D such that there are at least 
two possibilities, ( w, f ) , ( WI, ft ) E c(¢), and if h is an evaluation 
function of Xn in ( w,  f ) ,  h(xn} = aI ,  and if h is an evaluation function of 
Xn in ( WI, ft ) ,  h(xn} = a2 ' 
b. A dependent variable Xn occurring in ¢ is unidentified in c (</J) iff there 
are at least two elements al and a2 E D such that there are at least two 
possibilities, ( w, f ) ,  ( wI, ft )  E c(</J) , and if h'IJ is an evaluation function 
of Xn in ( w, f ) ,  h'IJ (xn} = aI , and if h'IJ is an evaluation function of Xn in 
( wI, ft ) , h'IJ (xn} = a2. 
A variable is unidentified in a context iff the values it is assigned in various possi­
bilities in that context are not necessarily the same. A variable may be unidentified 
either because there is not enough information in the current context to identify it or 
because it is unidentifiable in principle. The former situation obtains either because 
the speaker does not possess the required information to identify the variable or 
because she judges it irrelevant to the purposes of the conversation to provide it. A 
variable is unidentifiable in principle if it has narrow scope relative to disposition­
als ,  certain modals or conditionals .  We will come back to unidentifi able variables 
in Section 5. 
Turning now back to some, a first attempt is to suggest that it i s  lexically speci­
fied to impose the condition in [47] on the variable it introduces because 
[47] Unidentified variable constraint 
If Xn is introduced by some in an expression that is added to a file </J resulting 
in a file ¢' , Xn must be unidentified in c(¢') . 
This is an output context constraint, since it constrains the status of the variable 
in the output context. Note that the existential constraint in [28] could be made 
to follow from [47] were we to rule out contexts were a variable has to cover a 
singleton set. If such cases are ruled out, variables evaluated by a set of co-indexed 
functions could never be unidentified: there will be no possibility in which the 
variable is assigned a single value . 
If we want to capture the ' no imminent identification' restriction observed by 
Israel, [47] has to be strengthened so as to require the variable in question to stay 
unidentified in the contexts that the speaker projects as being the future contexts the 
conversation is to reach. In order to do this ,  I first take from Gunlogson 2001 the 
notion of the reduction set of a context c(¢), R(¢) . (See also Dekker 1 993) This is 
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the set of contexts that can be reached from c( </J) by increasing information. I define 
the reduction set here based on an accessibility relation R between contexts which 
is defined in [48] : 
[48 ]  c( </J) R c!( </J) iff for every ( W, f )  E c!( </J) there is a possibility ( w, f )  E c( </J) 
such thatft is a possibly trivial extension off 
The reduction set R(</J) of a context c(</J) is the set of contexts R-accessible from 
c(</J) . Note that if C!(</J) is R-accessible to c(</J) and the context set of c(</J) is not 
empty, WC!(</J) � Wc(</J) and WC! (</J) f= 0 . 
The notion that we need, that of the subset of accessible contexts that the speaker 
projects as future contexts , can be defined as a proper subset P(  </J) of R( </J) . We can 
now talk of stable lack of identification in case a variable is unidentified in all the 
contexts in P(</J) .  I suggest then that some imposes on the variable it introduces the 
output context constraint in [49] : 
[49] Stable lack of identification 
A variable introduced by some must be unidentified in every C!(</J') E P(</J') .  
Let u s  consider now the consequences [49] has concerning the distribution of some 
DPs . Note that the impossibility of these DPs to occur as measure phrases follows, 
since measure units flIe unique relative to a model. Some DPs are not good as ex­
istence assertions but are perfectly suited to indicate epistemic non-specificity. The 
contrast between [50a] , which indicates that the speaker doesn' t  know (or won ' t  tell) 
what the reason for Mary 's  depression is ,  and [SOb] , which indicates that Mary' s  de­
pression is not without a reason, is not surprising. 
[50] a. Mary was depressed for some reason (and could not go to the party) . 
b. Mary was depressed for a reason. 
Some DPs, just like their unmarked sisters, are compatible with both dependent and 
independent interpretations and therefore the ambiguity of the examples in [25] is 
predicted. They are, however, less precise because of the stable lack of identifica­
tion condition . This ,  I suggest, is responsible for the use of some as approximatively, 
exemplified in [5 1 ] .  
[5 1 ]  There were some three hundred people at the rally. 
Plural some and mass some share the lack of identification property that singular 
some has . They require the existence of a number or quantity from the value set 
and what is unidentified is the exact quantity/number involved. We predict that Ds 
associated with lack of identification in other languages may also have such uses . 
Romanian vreun and French quelque appear to confirm this prediction. (cf. Farkas 
(to appear)) .  
The fact that some i s  not felicitous in cases where identification i s  pragmatically 
irrelevant (as in [43] )  is also unsurprising: why use a marked form to indicate that 
a variable will stay unidentified when there is no reason to expect that it should be? 
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To sum up, it has been claimed here that some is marked relative to a(n) along 
two closely related dimensions : (i) quantificational force and (ii) marked lack of 
present and future identification. The fact that some DPs occur in a subset of the 
environments in which we find a(n) follows from these two properties .  In the next 
section we see that an output context condition involving identification is crucial 
for accounting for the distribution and interpretation of a certain DPs . 
5. A certain indefinites 
We first examine briefly the distribution of a certain indefinites, and then propose a 
constraint that accounts for it. 
A certain DPs love to be scopally specific, as in [52] , 
[52] I spoke to a certain high official yesterday, who assured me that everything is 
all right. 
but we have known at least since Hintikka's 1 986  example ,  [53 ] ,  that they may be 
dependent. 
[53] Every man forgot a certain date : his wife ' s  birthday. 
In [54] we see that there is no need for a contextually salient function from the 
domain of the universal to that of the indefinite for a dependent reading of a certain 
to be possible . 
. [54] Every student chose a certain poem by Emily Dickinson and analyzed it. 
It is the case, however, that dependent a certain, unlike dependent a(n) or some, 
requires there to be a non-random choice of value for the variable introduced by it 
relative to its evaluation parameter. This explains the strangeness of [55] : 1 1 
[55] #Everybody will choose a certain poem at random. 
Just like some, a certain must be existential . As shown by the unambiguous [56] , 
the variable introduced by a certain may not be interpreted generically and may not 
occur within the immediate scope of negation. 
[56] a.  A certain seagull lays eggs in the sand. 
b .  Mary didn't buy a certain apartment in San Fancisco when she could 
afford it and now it is too late . 
A certain DPs are special , however, in that they resist narrow scope interpretations 
relative to some (but not all)  modal expressions . Thus, in [57] , the indefinite is 
necessarily interpreted as having wide scope. 
[57] a. I hate imagining you lying there alone in a certain hospital . 
b. If Ben solves a certain problem from this list Mr. Koens will praise him. 
73 
74 Donka F. Farkas 
Concluding that a certain DPs must be interpreted relative to the world of evalu­
ation w would be too hasty, however, given that the examples in [5 8] are scopally 
ambiguous : 
[58] a. I dreamt that I had to catch a certain unicorn. 
b. Mary believes that a certain unicorn is ravaging her garden. 
We conclude that a certain DPs may occur within the scope of weak intensional 
predicates such as dream, believe and think but not within the scope of conditionals 
or dispositionals .  
In [59] we see that an indefinite in the complement of want is in principle three 
way ambiguous : 
[59] Poor delusional Mary ! She wants to catch a/some/a certain unicorn (she 
thinks has been ravaging her garden) . 
(i) The indefinite may have widest scope, in which case unicorns are assumed to 
exist in the world of the discourse ; (ii) the indefinite may have ' intermediary' scope 
(strengthened by the material in parentheses ) :  unicorns exist only in Mary 's epis­
temic alternatives , and she has a particular unicorn in mind that she wants to catch; 
(iii) the indefinite may have narrowest scope, in which case Mary's wish is satisfied 
no matter which (imaginary) unicorn she catches .  Crucially for us, the variant with 
a certain is compatible with (i) and (ii) but not (iii) . 
The correct account of a certain has to capture these modal peculiarities, the 
non-randomness requirement on dependent a certain, as well as the differences and 
similarities between a certain and the other indefinites in its paradigm. My proposal 
i s  that a certain involves a special output context constraint requiring the variable 
it introduces to be identjfiable based on a non-trivial identifying property. 12 When 
using a certain, one signals that there is an entity that is the right choice of value 
for the variable a certain introduces . While neither the current nor future contexts 
necessarily provide the information that would render the variable identified, there 
must be accessible contexts where the variable is identified. 
In order to be able to formulate this constraint I define first the notion of identi­
fiable variable in [60] : 
[60] Identifiable variable 
A variable Xn occurring in c(¢) is identifiable in c(¢) iff there is a C/(¢) E 
R( ¢) such that Xn is identified in C/( ¢) .  
A variable is identifiable in  a context if the context can in principle be extended to 
one where the variable is identified. There is no requirement that anybody possess 
identifying knowledge or that the variable be identified in the immediate future of 
the conversation, but only that it be in principle identifiable . If a variable is not 
identifiable, it is unidentifiable. If a variable is unidentifiable, there is  no accessible 
context in which it is identified, i .e ,  there is no accessible context in which the 
variable is given a single value in all possibilities in that context. 
The notion of a (non-trivial) identifying property for a variable relative to a 
context is defined in [6 1 ] :  
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[6 1 ]  Identifying property ofxn 
P is an identifying property of Xn in c( ¢) iff Xn is identified in c (  ¢) and for 
any Mv) that assigns a value to Xn in c(¢), h(V) (xn ) = uP(x} . 
The constraint imposed by a certain on the variable it introduces i s  formulated in 
[62] : 
[62] Identifiable variable constraint 
If a variable Xn is introduced by a certain in ¢ resulting in ¢/, (i) Xn may not 
be identified in c( ¢') and (ii) there must be a non-trivial identifying property 
P relative to some C/(¢/) accessible to C(¢/) . 
So far a certain was treated as a complex D .  A compositional analysis could be 
attempted by taking the adjective certain to contribute the restrictive condition 
certain(xn} on the variable introduced by a and assume that the denotation of the 
adjective certain is the set of identifying properties . An immediate problem that 
arises is the explanation of why certain can only occur with a, and therefore why 
*some certain, for instance, is ungrammatical .  The task is not trivial ,  since we 
saw that some DPs are compatible with the variable being identifiable . In order to 
explain the incompatibility of some with certain one would have to require the for­
mer to impose a constraint against the existence of an identifying property for the 
variable it introduces relative to accessible contexts , a constraint that appears too 
strong. Thus, a compositional account of a certain is close, but still out of reach. 
I tum now to examining some of the consequences of [62] relative to the distri­
bution of a certain DPs . First, note that a variable Xn occurring in c(¢) is  unidenti­
fiable in c(¢) if it is required to be given several values in every possibility in c(¢) . 
This happens in case the variable is interpreted by a set of functions coindexed with 
it, i . e . ,  if it is made to cover its domain. This is so because in every context ac­
cessible to c(¢) where the value set of Xn is not necessarily singleton, Xn i s  given 
multiple values .  (Recall that we assume that if a variable is made to cover its value 
set, contexts in which all possibilities involve a singleton value set for the variable 
in question are ruled out. ) It also happens in case a variable is given values by as­
signment functions across a set of worlds that are required to differ with respect to 
the value they assign to it. In this case, in every possibility in c( ¢)  the variable i s  
given multiple values. 
There are three immediate consequences of [62] . (i) A certain indefinites are 
predicted to be existential in the sense of being incompatible with interpretations 
that make them cover their value sets . The fact that these indefinites have no generic 
readings , are not available for unselective binding and my not occur in the imme­
diate scope of negation is accounted for. (ii) A certain indefinites are predicted not 
to occur within the scope of conditionals ,  dispositionals or under the narrowest in­
terpretation in the complement of want. This is so because such variables must be 
assigned different values at different worlds and therefore their interpretation is not 
compatible with [62] . (See subsection 5 .2 .  for details . )  (iii) The possibility of a cer­
tain DPs to be dependent is predicted, since dependency is not incompatible with 
identifiability. The non-random choice of value for dependent variables introduced 
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by a certain is due to the requirement of the existence of the identifying property. 
5.1. A certain and Weak Cross Over 
We now take a brief look at the proposal made in Kratzer 1 998 to treat a cer­
tain as contributing a choice-functional variable, under the assumption that such 
variables can be bound only contextually (or, alternatively, by text-level existential 
closure) . Dependent interpretations of a certain DPs are accounted for by  assuming 
that choice functions may involve implicit arguments that are bound independently 
of the choice functional variable. The effect of dependency is created by having 
such an implicit argument be bound by the universal the indefinite appears to be 
dependent on. In defense of this analysis ,  Chierchia 200 I brings up the fact that in 
[63 ] ,  a certain engineer cannot have narrow scope relative to every building. 
[63] A certain/an engineer inspected every building 
The lack of ambiguity here is attributable to W(eak)C(ross)O(ver) under the as­
sumption that the dependent interpretation would involve every buidling crossing 
over the co-referential implicit argument of a certain. It turns out, however, that 
in less bland examples , a certain DPs may in fact have narrow scope relative to a 
universal they c-command: 
[64] a. A certain carefully selected location will serve as backdrop to every 
presidential speech. 
b. A certain appropriately specialized lawyer will deal with every aspect 
of this complicated case. 
c. A certain member of the faculty phoned every applicant in an attempt to 
increase our incoming class .  
Next, note that having a certain analyzed as introducing a Kratzer-style choice 
functional variable would not explain the complexities of the interpretation of these 
DPs in modal environments without extra stipulations on the binding properties of 
such variables . The next subsection is devoted to working out some of the details 
involved in an account of the interpretation of a certain in such environments . Pre­
senting a fuller picture would take us further into intensional semantics than we can 
go here. 
5.2. A certain in intensional environments 
We first consider why [62] does not rule out a certain DPs from being interpreted 
within the scope of predicates like think and dream and then tum to scope effects in 
conditionals and in the complement of want. 
Epistemic predicates (think, believe, know) require their complements to be in­
terpreted relative to the epistemic base of the referent of their subject. An epistemic 
base Ea,w is the set of worlds associated by an accessibility relation E in A to an 
individual a and a world w. Epistemic bases are like context sets in that they contain 
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worlds consistent with what w is taken to be (as far as the conversation is concerned, 
in the case of the latter, and as far as a is concerned in the case of the former) . Sets 
of worlds having this property will be called centered. I assume that every cen­
tered set of worlds We has two properties : (i) consistency, defined in [65] and (ii) 
non-empty domain iutersection, defined in [66] . 
[65] Consistency 
We i= 0 
[66] Non-empty domain intersection 
For every We, nwEWc Dw i= 0 . 
Turning now to [67] , it is generally assumed that in order for it to be true in w, 
[67] John thinks that [ a  unicorn is ravaging his garden ] Sf . 
SI  must be true in all the worlds wI E Ej,w , where j is the individual named by 
John. The complement of epistemic verbs then has to be true in the worlds of the 
epistemic base associated to its subject, which is a centered set. I assume that the 
complements of fictional verbs such as dream or those of verbs of saying such as 
say, claim, declare share with epistemic verbs the property of having to be true in a 
set of centered worlds. The non-empty intersection of the domains of the worlds in 
a centered set will be called the domain of the set in question. 
The effect of adding [67] to a context c( cp) resulting in an output context c( cp/) is 
to rule out from the possibilities in the input context all those in which the comple­
ment is not true in John's  epistemic base relative to the relevant world. The output 
context is characterized as in [68] , where 'lj; is the semantic representation of SI and 
c( 'lj;) is the set of world-function pairs that satisfy it in M. 
[68] C(cp/) = { (  w, J) E c(cp) : for every wI E Ej,w , there is an extensionji ofJ such 
that ( WI, f! ) E c( 'lj;) } 
Common to epistemic and fictional predicates, as well as to verbs of saying, is that 
their complement is added to a centered set of worlds in the same way in which 
declarative sentences are added to a context. In both cases the effect is  to shrink a 
centered set by removing from it worlds in which the sentence i s  not true. 
If a variable Xn has wide scope relative to think it is given values by J from Dw . 
If it has narrow scope, it is given values by f! from the domains of the worlds in Ej,w ' 
Crucially, however, in neither case is the variable required to be assigned multiple 
values in all contexts that are accessible to c(cp/) . If the variable has wide scope, 
contexts where the variable is identified are not ruled out: there are contexts in the 
reduction set of c( cp/) where Xn is identified, and therefore Xn is identifiable .  Recall 
that the contexts in the reduction set of c( cp/) are more informative and therefore 
they involve contexts whose context sets are subsets of WC(cp/) . One such context 
is the omniscient one, where the only element of the context set is w. 
If the variable has narrow scope, it remains identifiable. More informative con­
texts may contain more information concerning what John thinks and in such con­
texts Xn may be identified. This is so because more informative contexts may in­
volve adding information concerning John' s  epistemic base and therefore shrinking 
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the worlds compatible with what John knows in every world of the context in ques­
tion. Complete epistemic bases, where the set of worlds compatible with what John 
knows is a singleton are not ruled out. Since nothing rules out more informative 
contexts in which Xn is identified, Xn is identifiable. The same is true of the comple­
ments of fictional verbs and verbs of saying. In their cases too, there are access ible 
contexts where the bases they introduce shrink enough to have the variable in their 
scope identified. We thus predict that [69] does not necessarily commit its speaker 
to a belief in unicorns :  
[69] John thought/dreamt/said! that a certain unicorn was ravaging his garden. 
Let us now consider indefinites occurring in the antecedent of a conditional, as in 
[70] . 
[70] If Ben solves a/some/a certain problem from this list Mr. Koens will praise 
him. 
This sentence is true in a world w iff for every wI that is close to w and in which 
the antecedent is true, the consequent is true in wI. Assuming that [70] is added to 
a context c(<jJ) , the resulting context C(<jJI) is defined as in [7 1 ] ,  where 'lj; and 'lj;1 are 
the semantic representations of the antecedent and the consequent respectively. 
[7 1 ]  C(<jJI) = { (  w, f)  E c(<jJ) : for every wI close to w such that there is an extension 
ft off and ( WI, f' ) E c( 'lj;), there is an extension!" of ft such that ( wI, f' ) E 
C('lj;/) } 
I assume that conditionals carry the presupposition that the set of worlds estab­
lished on the basis of the antecedent is non-empty and non-singleton, i .e . ,  they are 
felicitous only in contexts that meet this condition . 
When a variable introduced in the antecedent has wide scope relative to the 
conditional,  it is evaluated by f relative to Dw and is identifiable like all scopally 
specific variables . We correctly predict therefore that the indefinite in [70] may 
have wide scope relative to the conditional , describing a situation in which Mr. 
Koens 's  praise is not easy to earn. In more informative accessible contexts we find 
out which problem is the one that would elicit it. When, on the other hand, such 
a variable has narrow scope relative to the conditional , values for Xn are given by 
ft from Dw;. The set of worlds established by the antecedent will contain a world 
for every problem on the list. No further information can narrow down the choice 
of value for Xn since solving any of the problems on the list elicits Mr. Koens' s  
praise.  The problems must co-vary with the worlds, and since the worlds cannot 
be a singleton set in all possibilities in a context, the variable will not be identified 
in any. Our analysis correctly predicts that a(n) and some may have narrow scope 
relative to the conditional but a certain may not. 
Let us consider now indefinites in the complement of want, exemplified in [72] : 
[72] John wants to catch a/some/a certain unicorn. 
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I follow Heim 1 992 in assuming that want requires a particular ordering relation 
on the worlds in the epistemic base of its subject. The sentence in [72] is true in a 
world w iff there is a partial ordering (or preference) relation on the worlds in Ej,w 
such that every wI E Ej,w in which the complement of want is true is ordered higher 
than closest worlds in which the complement is not true. The output context c( ¢/) 
that results from adding [72] to an input context c(¢) is defined in [73] ,  where 'ljJ is 
the semantic representation of the complement of want: 
[73] C(¢/) = { ( w, f) E c(¢) : for every wI E Ej,w such that there is an extensionfl 
of f and ( WI, ft ) E c('ljJ), WI ) w ", where w "  is maximally similar to w '  and 
w "  E Ej,w - Wc('ljJ) } .  
The verb want shares with epistemic predicates the fact that the epistemic base of 
its subject is relevant to establishing the truth conditions of sentences whose main 
verb it is .  Unlike those predicates, however, the effect of the complement on the 
epistemic base is different. The role of the complement of want is similar to that of 
the antecedent of a conditional because it is used to define a set of worlds : all the 
worlds (within a given set) in which the complement is true must be ordered higher 
than those in which it is not. 
The evaluation possibilities of a variable introduced by an indefinite occurring 
in the complement of want are the following: (i) The variable may be given values 
by f relative to Dw (widest scope) . (ii) The variable may be given values by fl rel­
ative to Dj,w , the domain of John ' s  epistemic base in w (intermediary scope) . (iii) 
The variable may be given values by fl relative to Dw1 (narrowest scope) .  In the first 
case the variable is identifiable, as all scopally specific variables are . In the second 
case the variable is identifiable too because its value is constant across the worlds 
wI. Under this interpretation, within every possibility in C(¢/) (and within every 
possibility in the contexts R-accessible from it) , worlds that are required to be pre­
ferred relative to that possibility involve John catching the same unicorn. The only 
difference between (i) and (ii) is that in this case the unicorn is chosen among the 
entities John believes exist. (iii) Finally, the variable may be given values by fl rel­
ative to wI. In this case, all the worlds in Ej,w in which John catches some unicorn 
or other are preferred to those in which he does not. The preference relation now 
is  insensitive to which unicorn John catches and the values assigned to the variable 
introduced by the indefinite co-vary with wI. More informative contexts cannot sin­
gle out a unique unicorn that John has to catch in order to be in a preferred world.  
There is no accessible context in which the variable introduced by the indefinite i s  
given the same value across all possibilities in  the context, and therefore under this 
interpretation the variable is not identifiable. The constraint in [62] is  compatible 
with the first two evaluations but not the third and therefore a certain cannot be 
given a narrowest scope interpretationY The difference between want and condi­
tionals is that the former makes possible the interpretation of an indefinite within 
its complement relative to the epistemic domain of the subject, while conditionals 
do not involve this extra layer. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have suggested here that the three Ds examined differ with respect to constraints 
they impose on the variable they introduce. The D a(n) is unmarked, in that it im­
poses no constraints whatsoever. Some is marked in that it imposes a functional 
constraint and an output context constraint requiring the variable to be unidentified 
in projected contexts. A certain is marked in that it imposes an output constraint 
requiring the variable it introduces to be identifiable on the basis of a property. This 
latter constraint turns out to be more restrictive than the two constraints imposed by 
some and therefore the concentric distribution of the three Ds is accounted for. 
Treating a(n) as the unmarked singular D may help explain why it and none of 
the others is used in situations where a DP does not introduce a variable ,  as in the 
case of predicative DPs, exemplified in [74] , or in cases where the DP is property­
denoting, as in existence statements, or as objects of prevent. 14 
[74] Mary is a/*some/*a certain doctor. 
[75] a. There is a/*some/*a certain God afterall ! 
b. Mary has a/*some/*a certain brother. 
[76] Negotiations prevented a/*some/*a certain war. 
I assume that in these cases the presence of the D is syntactically motivated and 
that these DPs do not involve the introduction of a variable . Choosing the least 
marked D as the default D is explicable in optimality-theoretic flavored terms: the 
only property of a(n) one has to disregard here is that of introducing a variable. In 
the case of the other Ds we would have to disregard their extra constraints as well . 
If the approach suggested here is on the right track it would allow us to cap­
ture the details of the distribution and interpretation of other Ds in English and 
elsewhere. Further work would, hopefully, lead to a better understanding of the 
type of constraints Ds encode and eventually, to a better understanding of their 
cross-linguistic typology. Particularly easy to characterize in present terms is the 
constraint imposed by another, brought to my attention by Bill Ladusaw. The con­
straint is that the variable it introduces must be given a value different from that 
given to a previously introduced variable. This is an input context constraint in the 
sense that it requires the prior existence of a variable . Accounting for indefinite 
this requires a different type of constraint, one involving topicality or saliency. An 
interesting open question is what other constraints are needed. In particular, with 
respect to identifiability, the discussion above suggests that a possible constraint 
would be one requiring the variable introduced to be unidentifiable. Whether such 
determiners actually exist remains to be seen. 
V ARIETIES OF INDEFINITES 
Notes 
*Various p arts of this work were presented during a seminar in Winter 200 1 ,  at S anta Cruz, 
at a workshop on choice functions, August 200 1 ,  in Helsinki, at the Paris Colloquium on 
Syntax and Semantics (CS SP),  October 200 1 ,  at a DiP Colloqium, April 2002, in Amster­
dam, and at Chicago, in May 2002. I wish to thank audiences at these events , as well as 
at SALT 1 2, in S an Diego,  for helpful questions and comments . I am grateful to Christine 
Gunlogson for discussions on matters relevant to this  paper, and to J aye Padgett and Ben­
jamin Farkas for being patient native consultants .  An earlier version of the s ection on some 
will appear in the proceedings of the CSSP conference, and an earlier incarnation of this 
paper appeared as On some Indefinites in English in K. von Heusinger, R. Kempson and W. 
Meyer-Viol (eds . ) ,  Proceedings of the Workshop " Choice Functions and Natural Language 
Semantics ", Arbeitsbapier 1 1 0.FB Sprachwissenschaft, U. Konstanz, pp. 35-62. 
1.  Issues of topicality and s aliency would become crucial were we to extend our attention 
to indefinite this, first discussed in Prince 1 98 1 .  
2. One important advantage i s  that assignments outside the value set are irrelevant for 
satisfaction and truth conditions .  A related advantage is that material implication can be 
dispensed with when giving the semantics of universally quantified expressions . Under the 
assumption that natural language conditionals are not to be treated as material implication 
either, one circumvents the problem discussed by Heim 1982  and Reinhart 1 997 concerning 
the ' in situ ' interpretation of wide scope indefinites occurring in the antecedents of condi­
tionals. 
3. In Heim 1 982 auxiliary files exist only as part of the process of interpretation, as substeps 
in complex satisfaction conditions. 
4. I assume that semantically relevant number features are responsible for semantic singu­
larlity/plurality effects . S ince we are looking only at singular Ds ,  details  concerning the 
interpretation of number features can and will be ignored here. 
5. I will not be concerned here with the question of what determines the choice between 
the two possible interpretations for the indefinite. 
6. The fact that dependent indefinites may not co-vary with a generic indefinite either, 
shown by the ungrammaticality of *Egy siralynak van egy-egy csore ' A  seagull has a-a 
beak' , is due to an additional constraint on reduplicated indefinites requiring the value set 
of the variable they depend on to be well-delimited in some sense. While reduplicated 
indefinites are licensed by distributive readings on definite plural DPs, for instance, they 
are not licensed by distributive readings of indefinite bare plurals :  A gyerekek hoztak egy­
egy konyvet 'The children brought a book each' vs. *Gyerekek jatszottak egy-egy labdaval 
' Children were playing with a-a ball ' .  
7. We consider here only the version o f  some that occurs with count nouns and thus ignore 
' mass '  some exemplified in Martin drank some wine. The modifier use of some exemplified 
in E .B .  White 's  Some pig! will also be ignored. 
8. The intermediate reading of this sentence is problematic for the claim in S chwartzchild 
2002, according to which indefinites scoping out of an island are to be analyzed as singleton 
indefinites . 
9. The derogatory fl avor and the possibility of being modified by or other are properties 
that differentiate some from all the other indefinite Ds in English. 
lO. A variable bound by a quantifier or in the immediate scope of negation cannot be iden-
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tified because in order for it to be identified, all the possibilities in the context should have 
the same singleton value set for the variable in question. This situation is incompatible with 
the a variable having to cover its value set. 
1 1 .  l owe this observation to Polly Jacobson. 
12. The notion of ' non-trivial property ' ,  taken from de Hoop's  1 995 insightful discussidn 
of enkele and sommige in Dutch is meant to rule out the trivial property of being identical 
with oneself and any other properties that all entities have in all worlds .  
1 3 .  Taking Ej,w as the domain over which the implicit universal involved in want quantifies 
is an oversimplification. Just like in the case of counterfactual conditionals,  the domain has 
to go beyond this set in certain cases . Thus,  even if it is known by both you and me that I 
will buy a particular house, 1 30 on Sherman St. in S anta Cruz and no other, if I s ay I want 
to buy a house in Santa Cruz because [ like to live there we may interpret the variable intro­
duced by a house as having narrowest scope and therefore given multiple values. What i s  
involved is  a limited expanding of  the epistemic base of the subject by disregarding certain 
facts . 
14 .  ' S trong' existential assertions such as [75a] differ from ' weak'  ones such as those men­
tioned in the outset in [ 1 ]  in that the former but not the latter are incompatible with marked 
indefinites . Thus,  [75b] contrasts with Mary has some cousin who is Harrison Ford 's sister­
in-law. (For reasons that are unclear to me, using brother or sister instead of cousin here i s  
much less  appropriate. )  Strong existential assertions ,  I assume, affirm existence and involve 
a property-denoting pivot. Weak existentials introduce a discourse referent contributed by"  
their pivot DP. Note also that the use of a(n) in these examples is different from the use 
of the definite determiner with proper names in languages that permit or require it .  Proper 
names introduce a variable. The question in their case is whether they may do it on their 
own or need a D to do so. 
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